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I. Introduction
The major 1969 corporate law developments of particular
interest to the California practitioner were: (1) California
appellate decisions which, at least by implication, greatly
broaden the scope of a controlling shareholder's duty to minority shareholders; (2) amendments to the California Corporations Code; and (3) amendments to the Delaware General
Corporation Law.
In Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co./ the California Supreme
Court declared that majority shareholders must adhere to a
standard of good faith and inherent fairness to minority
shareholders in transactions where control of the corporation
is material. In Brown v. Halbert,2 the Court of Appeal spoke
of a "fiduciary relationship" between the dominant stockholder and the minority stockholders even in the absence of
"special facts."
There were several amendments to the California Corporations Code in 1969, the most important of which concern
1. 1 Ca1.3d 93, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592,
460 P.2d 464 (1969).
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2. 271 Cal. App.2d 252, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 781 (1969).
CAL LAW 1970

2

Sigman: Corporations

Corporations

expanded corporate information filings with the Secretary
of State and increased flexibility in determining accounting
treatment of certain transactions. 3
In response to the desires of corporate management as reflected by the efforts of the corporate bar, extensive changes
were made in the Delaware General Corporation Law in 1969,
carrying further Delaware's pro-management orientation vis-avis stockholders and creditors; much of this legislation was
also in furtherance of the goal of minimizing formality. Although this publication is concerned primarily with trends and
developments in California law, Delaware corporation law is
of great importance to the California bar. Most California
attorneys have clients that are, should be, or may in the future
be incorporated under Delaware law, or clients that may acquire or be acquired by Delaware corporations, or clients that
may become stockholders or creditors of Delaware corporations. 4
3. The extensive revision of California's "blue sky" law, which became
effective January 2, 1969, was enacted
during 1968. See Bader, BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS, Cal Law-Trends and
Developments 1969, p. 139.
4. As a result of Delaware's liberal
statute, its extensive and rather
sophisticated judicial development of
corporation law and its sympathetic
attitude towards business corporations,
"Delaware became and remains the
most popular state in which to incorporate any interstate company of substantial size." Cary, Cases and Materials on Corporations 9 (4th ed. 1969).
See generally, Israeis, Corporate Practice, pp. 159-160 (2d ed. 1969), and
Rohrlich, Organizing Corporate and
Other Business Enterprises Ch. VI (4th
ed. 1967). Some of the key features
of Delaware law that make it attractive have been described as follows:
In addition to lower capital stock or
franchise taxes in Delaware, other
advantages which induce corporate
CAL LAW 1970
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managements to seek incorporation in
Delaware include: greater freedom to
pay dividends and make distributions;
greater ease of charter amendment and
less restrictions upon selling assets,
mortgaging, leasing, and merging, due
to the lower percentage of shareholder
approval required and also by virtue
of lesser rights of appraisal for dissenting minority shareholders; freedom
from mandatory cumulative voting;
permission to have staggered boards
of directors; lesser pre-emptive rights
for shareholders; clearer rights of indemnification for directors and officers;
greater freedom of action in many
crucial respects for management; and
a climate of opinion, thought to be
prevalent in the legislature and courts,
generally favorable to management and
generally unreceptive to the dissident
minority shareholder. Kaplan, Foreign
Corporations and Local -Corporate
Policy, 21 Vand. L. Rev. 433 at 436
(1968).
167
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II. Judicial Development of Protection of Minority Shareholders

The need for protection of minority shareholders, particularly in connection with the disposition of controlling stock
interests, has been the subject of much scholarly analysis. 6
Brown v. Halbert,6 decided by the Court of Appeal on March
28, 1969, and Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & CO.,7 decided by
the Supreme Court on November 7, 1969,8 held that a requirement of fairness to the minority exists in transactions where
control of the corporation is material.
The so-called "traditional" or "majority" approach holds
that a controlling shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation but not to minority shareholders, and that the sale
of contro19 at a premium is permissible provided that the sale
5. See, e.g., Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity
in the Sale of Shares, 78 Harv. L.
Rev. 505 (1965); Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling
Shares:
A
Reply
to Professor
Andrews, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 420
(1965); Berle, The Price of Power:
Sale of Corporate Control, 50 Cornell
L.Q. 628 (1965); Jennings, Trading in
Corporate Control, 44 Cal. L. Rev. 1
(1956); Eisenberg, The Legal Role of
Shareholders and Management in
Modern Corporation Decision Making,
57 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1969); and Bayne,
The Sale-of-Control Premium: The
Intrinsic Illegitimacy, 47 Texas L. Rev.
215 (1969).
6. 271 Cal. App.2d 252, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 781 (1969); original opinion
modified, April 25, 1969 (see 271 ACA
881 ).
7. 1 Ca1.3d 93, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592,
460 P.2d 464 (1969).
8. Opinion modified on denial of
rehearing, December 10, 1969.
9. With regard to the meaning of
"control" in this context, see the
Andrews and Jennings articles cited at
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note 5 above. In both the Jones and
Brown cases, the defendants owned and
dealt with stock interests greater than
50%. It remains to be seen how the
doctrine enunciated in those cases will
be applied to transactions in shares
aggregating less than 50% but still
constituting "control" for various purposes. See, e.g., Essex Universal Corp.
v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 13 ALR3d
346 (2d Cir., 1962) where, on remand,
the District Judge would be required
to make a finding that there was a
"practical certainty" that the purchaser
of the 30% block could indeed elect a
majority of the board in order to hold
valid a clause in the transfer agreement
requiring the resignation of directors.
See also Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App.
Div.2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1964),
afJ'd 14 N.Y.2d 877 (1964), 249 N.Y.S.
2d 877, 198 N.E.2d 908 (owner of 3%
stock interest agreed to have seven
directors resign seriatim; court voided
election, holding that corporate management is not a subject of trade and
cannot be bought apart from actual
stock control, but stating that "where
there has been a transfer of a majority
of stock, or even such a percentage
CAL LAW 1970
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does not result in injury to the corporation and does not involve an unlawful sale of corporate office. Injury to the
corporation has been found where the controlling shareholder
fraudulently or negligently transfers control to purchasers
who subsequently mismanage or loot the corporation. 10 Also,
liability has been imposed where the seller induced the purchaser to buy the controlling shares rather than the corporate
assets sought by the purchaser, thus diverting to himself a
corporate opportunity.l1 In other jurisdictions, the so-called
"special facts" doctrine was adopted to permit minority shareholders to obtain a portion of the premium or to recover
damages in certain situations where the transfer of control
did not result in injury to the corporation but there was inequitable conduct on the part of the controlling shareholder.
Modern California cases 12 have applied the "special facts"
doctrine, although older cases contain language asserting the
"traditional" approach.13 In American Trust Co. v. California
Western States Life Insurance Co.,l4 the Supreme Court analyzed these earlier cases, stating that such language was
dicta, and observed that "the question is still open in this
state as to whether we shall follow the majority rule, the
majority rule as modified by the 'special facts' doctrine, or
the minority rule; . . . ."15 In Taylor v. Wright/ 6 Justice
Peters predicted that the Supreme Court would "adopt either
the 'special facts' doctrine or the minority rule."17
as gives working control, a change of
directors by resignation and filled
vacancies is proper." (246 N.Y.S.2d
913, 950).

Tryon v. Smith, 191 Ore. 172, 229 P .2d
251 (1951).

10. See, e.g., Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28
N.Y.S.2d 622 (1941); Insuranshares
Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F.
Supp. 22 (E.D., Pa. 1940).

13. E.g., Ryder v. Bamberger, 172
Cal. 791, 158 P. 753 (1916).

11. See, e.g., Dunnett v. Am, 71 F.
2d 912 (10th Cir., 1934); American
Trust Co. v. California Western States
Life Insurance Co., 15 Cal.2d 42, 98
P.2d 497 (1940); Commonwealth Title
Insurance & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227
Pa. 410, 76 A. 77 (1910); but see
CAL LAW 1970
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12. E.g., Low v. Wheeler, 207 Cal.
App.2d 477, 24 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1962).

14. 15
(1940).

Cal.2d

42,

98

P.2d

497

15. 15 Cal.2d 42, 61, 98 P.2d 497,
507 (1940).
16. 69 Cal. App.2d 371, 159 P.2d
980 (1945).
17. 69 Cal. App.2d 371, 382, 159
P.2d 980, 985 (1945).
169
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Against this background, let us examine the Brown and
Jones cases.
In Brown v. Halbert,18 four minority stockholders brought
a class action 19 seeking, inter alia, to impose a trust on a
portion of the funds the defendants realized from the sale of
their majority stock interest in the Tulare Savings & Loan
Association. 20
Halbert, president, chairman of the board and dominant
stockholder of the association, was approached by a prospective purchaser and asked if the association was for sale. Halbert replied that it was not, but that he and his wife would
consider selling their shares (53% of the outstanding stock)
at 2-1/2 times book value. The association's board of directors and the other stockholders were apparently never consulted as to the offer to buy the association. Subsequently,
the Halberts entered into an agreement to sell their stock for
2-1/2 times book value, or $1,548.05 per share. The agreement provided, among other things, that the buyer could
inspect the books of the association; that, contrary to past
practice, no dividends were to be paid during the period of
escrow; and that, upon the close of escrow, the selling stockholders would submit resignations as officers and directors
and hold such meetings as might be requested by the buyer.
The minority stockholders were not informed of the transaction until after it had been negotiated.
18. 271 Cal. App.2d 252, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 781 (1969).
19. The complaint named four defendants, of whom only Edward Halbert
was claimed to be the principal violator of fiduciary duties. The three
other defendants "are charged with accountability for their acquiescence in
his actions and by reason of their
acceptance of the benefits." (271 Cal.
App.2d 252, 253, n. 1,76 Cal. Rptr. 781,
782 (1969). The other defendants were
Halbert's wife; R. Morris, who was
secretary-treasurer, a director and
second in command of the operation

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/7
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of the association, and who was retained as the manager by the purchaser; and Robert Tienken.
The
opinion does not tell of any connection between Tienken and either Halbert or the association.
20. After the judgment for the
defendants was reversed on appeal, the
parties reached a settlement agreement
providing for liability in the amount
of $175,000. (See Crocker, Brown v.
Halbert-One Small Step for Stockholder Equal Opportunity, 45 L.A.
Bar. Bull. 57 at 80 (1969).)
CAL LAW 1970
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Upon completion of the purchase of Halbert's stock, the
buyer indicated its desire to acquire the stock of the minority
stockholders at $300 per share. Halbert, while still president
and chairman of the board, assisted the buyer by pressuring
the minority stockholders to sell their shares at that price,
telling them that dividends would not be paid for a number
of years and that the stock would not be worth much. All
but a few minority stockholders sold their stock at prices
ranging between $300 and $650 per share.
The Court of Appeal reviewed the authorities and stated
that the more recent California cases have followed the "special facts" doctrine. It decided, however, that the "special
facts" doctrine should not be applied where the "majority
stockholder-director sells the controlling block of stock to
outside purchasers and by doing so causes the minority stock
to be devaluated,"! holding that in his capacity as president,
chairman of the board and dominant stockholder, Halbert
stood in a fiduciary relationship to both the corporation and
the minority stockholders. The burden of proof, the court
stated, was on Halbert to show that he had not breached his
duty in securing a return for his stock higher than that received by the minority stockholders for theirs. In discussing
this fiduciary duty, the court stated that:
Every sale of a block of control stock should not per se
be subject to attack, but where the amount received by
the majority stockholder-director seller is so disproportionate to the price available to the minority stockholders, '
then such fiduciary-seller must show that no advantage
was taken if the sale is questioned. 2
Here, Halbert not only failed to make any effort to obtain
for the minority the same price that he received, but he used
his position to actively assist the buyer to acquire the minority stock at a lower price. The court cited a number of commentators and concluded that:
1. 271 Cal. App.2d 252, 264, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 781, 788 (1969),
CAL. L.AW 1970
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2. 271 Cal. App.2d 252, 268, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 781, 791 (1969),
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The rule we have adopted here simply is that it is the
duty of the majority stockholder-director, when contemplating the sale of the majority stock at a price not available to other stockholders and which sale may prejudice
the minority stockholders, is [sic] to act affirmatively
and openly with full disclosure so that every opportunity
is given to obtain substantially the same advantages
that such fiduciary secured and for the full protection
of the minority.3
In a concurring opinion, Justice Draper stated that the
Brown case "seems to me to fall within the rule of Low v.
Wheeler [citation omitted], or, at most to require but a moderate and reasonable extension of that rule. Hence I would
base the decision upon the special facts doctrine as applied
in Low.,,4
The complex facts of Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co." are
summarized as follows: In May, 1959,85% of the outstanding stock of United Savings and Loan Association was owned
by H. F. Ahmanson & Co. and certain relatives and business associates of H. F. Ahmanson. The remaining 15%
was owned by some four hundred persons, including the plaintiff. The Ahmanson group organized a holding company,
United Financial Corporation of California, and exchanged
their shares in the Association for shares of United. 6 In 1960,
United issued stock and convertible debentures to the public; of the $7,200,000 proceeds, $6,200,000 was distributed
as a return of capital to the original United stockholders.
The accompanying prospectus noted that dividends from the
Association would be utilized if the direct earnings of the
holding company were insufficient to meet the obligations under the debentures. 7 In February, 1961, another public
3. 271 Cal. App.2d 252, 272, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 781, 793-794 (1969).
4. 271 Cal. App.2d 252, 273-274, 76
Cal. Rptr. 781, 795 (1969).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/7

5. 1 Ca1.3d 93, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592,
460 P.2d 464 (1969).
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6. In addition to the Association
stock, United also owned three insurance agencies and stock in a fourth.
7. In addition, the representations
of United to the Corporations Commissioner (according to plaintiff's allegations) asserted that the financial
CAL LAW 1970
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offering was made by United, accompanied by a secondary
offering by the original investors, at an aggregate offering
price of $15,275,000. This created a public market for
United stock and, incident thereto, substantially precluded
the creation of a public market for the Association stock. In
September, 1960, when the book value of the Association
stock was $1,411.57 per share, United (then the owner of
87.3% of the Association stock) offered to purchase some
of the minority shares for $1,100 per share. In December,
1960, the president of the Association, who was at that time
a director of both United and the Association, contacted the
remaining minority shareholders of the Association and advised them that there would be no dividends paid on the
Association stock in the near future except the regular annual
$4 per share dividend. In May, 1961, the minority shareholders were offered United shares worth approximately $2,400 for each Association share. By way of contrast, the value
in August, 1961, of the United 'shares received by defendants
for each Association share exchanged by them in the formation of the holding company had risen to approximately
$8,800, and during 1960-1961 had sold for as much as
$13,127.41. In 1962, the Association paid an extra dividend
of $84 per share.
The defendants in the case were United, fifteen individuals
and four corporations, all of whom were present or former
shareholders or officers of the Association and all but one of
whom incorporated United. Judgment was rendered for defendants after an order sustaining demurrers, and the case on
appeal was presented on the pleadings supplemented by stipulated facts.
The Supreme Court dealt first with the contention that
plaintiff lacked capacity to sue on the theory that any injury
suffered by plaintiff was common to all minority shaff~ilOlders
of the Association and, therefore, that any cause of action
reserves for debenture repayment
required by the Commissioner's rules
would be satisfied by having United
exercise its control to cause the As-

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
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sociation to liquidate or encumber its
income-producing assets and then cause
the Association to distribute the cash
proceeds to United.
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was derivative in nature. s Rejecting this contention, the Court
held that plaintiff did not seek to recover on behalf of the corporation for injury done to the corporation and that the
gravamen of her cause of action was injury directly to her
and the other minority shareholders. "The individual wrong
necessary to support a suit by a shareholder need not be
unique to that plaintiff . . . . If the injury is not incidental
to an injury to the corporation, an individual cause of action
exists."9
Plaintiff claimed to represent "all of that portion of the
other minority stockholders who are similarly situated who
wish to rely thereon and who agree to compensate plaintiff
and her attorneys for reasonable attorneys' fees in an amount
to be determined by the court after trial. "10 The Court held
that this was not an allegation of a class composed simply of
persons who agreed with plaintiff but that the class designated
consisted of the minority shareholders of the Association,
i.e., those who held Association stock after the defendants exchanged their shares for United shares. The language concerning agreement to share in the litigation expenses "does
no more than state the applicable rule with regard to equitable
apportionment of the litigation expenses incurred by a plaintiff who successfully prosecutes an action on behalf of a
c1ass."l1 The Court held that the requisite community of
interest (;xisted among the minority shareholders and that
the class was readily ascertainable. 12
The Court then turned to the heart of the case in a portion
of the opinion captioned "Majority Shareholders' Fiduciary
Responsibility." The Court rejected the position that shareholders owe no fiduciary obligation to other shareholders
"absent reliance on inside information, use of corporate as-

10. 1 Ca1.3d 93, 120, 81 ral. Rptr.
592, 608, 460 P.2d 464, 480 (1969),

12. In the Brown case, the court
stated that the action was clearly a
proper class action and that the matter
had not been questioned. 271 Cal.
App.2d 252, 272, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781,
794 (1969).

11. 1 Ca1.3d 93, 120, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592, 608, 460 P.2d 464, 480 (1969).
174

CAL LAW 1970

8. Set Cal. Fin. Code § 7616.
9. I Ca1.3c1 93, 107, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592, 599, 460 P.2d 464, 471 (1969).
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sets, or fraud.,,13 Citing, inter alia, Brown v. Halbert/ 4 the
Court stated: "Any use to which [majority shareholders] put
the corporation or their power to control the corporation
must benefit all shareholders proportionately and must not
conflict with the proper conduct of the corporation's business.,,15
The Court reviewed earlier California cases and concluded
that "[t]he rule that has developed in California is a comprehensIve rule of 'inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the
corporation and those interested therein,' "16 and held that
this rule applies to officers, directors, and controlling shareholders in the exercise of powers enjoyed by virtue of their
position and that it applies to transactions wherein controlling
shareholders seek an advantage in the transfer or use of their
controlling stock. The opinion declared that the traditional
theories of fiduciary obligation as tests of the responsibility
of majority shareholders to the minority are not adequate,
particularly in view of the increasing complexity of financial
transactions. Although the courts have recognized the potential for abuse or unfair advantage in the sale of control at a
premium or the sale of control to looters or incompetents,
no comprehensive rule had emerged in other jurisdictions, and
most of the commentators had approached the problem from
the perspective of advantage gained in the sale of control.
The Court concluded that the case at bench, in which no transfer of actual control was directly involved, demonstrated that
the injury to the minority anticipated by the commentators
could be inflicted with impunity under the traditional rules
and supported the conclusion that "the comprehensive rule
of good faith and inherent fairness to the minority in any
transaction where control of the corporation is material"17 is
applicable to controlling shareholders.
13. 1 Ca1.3d 93, 108, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592, 599, 460 P.2d 464, 471 (1969).
14. 271 Cal. App.2d 252, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 781 (1969).
15. 1 Cal.3d 93, 108, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592, 599, 460 P.2d 464, 471 (1969).
CAL. LAW 1970
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16. 1 Cal.3d 93, 110, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592,600,460 P.2d 464, 472 (1969).
17. 1 Ca1.3d 93, 112, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592, 602, 460 P.2d 464, 474 (1969).
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The Court then turned to an analysis of the facts, stating
that in an effort to exploit the investor interest in stock of
savings and loan associations, defendants, in their controlling
position, could have created a market for the Association's
stock, or could have created a holding company and permitted
all of the Association's shareholders to exchange their shares
before offering the holding company stock to the public. Under either of these routes, all shareholders would have benefited equally and the minority shareholders would have been
able to extricate themselves without sacrifice of their investment if they chose not to remain in the new structure. Thus,
said the Court, the defendants chose a course of action in which
they used control of the Association to obtain for themselves
an advantage not made available to all shareholders, and,
on the facts alleged, did so without regard to the resulting
detriment to the minority shareholders and in the absence of
any compelling business purpose. 1S
The opinion points out that the defendants may present
evidence at trial tending to show "such good faith or compelling business purpose that would render their action fair
under the circumstances,,,19 noting that defendants' burden
would have been much less had they afforded the minority an
opportunity to exchange their stock on an equal basis or
offered to purchase the minority stock at a price arrived
at by independent appraisa1. 20

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/7

18. The opinion pointed out that the
defendants had secured an additional
advantage for themselves through their
use of control of the Association when
they pledged that control of the Association's assets and earnings to secure the
debt of the holding company, a debt
that had been incurred for their benefit.
The court expressed concern that any
decision regarding use of the Association's assets and earnings would have to
be made in the context of the potentially
conflicting interests of the business
needs of the Association and the duty
to the United stockholders.
176

19. 1 Ca1.3d 93, 114, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592, 604, 460 P.2d 464, 476 (1969).
20. The defendants suggested that
their transfer to United of related insurance businesses and the subsequent
acquisition of another savings and loan
association by United were necessary
to the creation of the market for
United shares. "Whether defendants
could have created a market for a
holding company that controlled a
single association or reasonably believed that they could not, goes to their
good faith and to the existence of a
proper business purpose for electing
CAL LAW 1970
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Turning to the question of damages, l the opinion noted
that the transactions in question had resulted in a substantial
change in the position of the minority shareholders since
control of the Association had been transferred to a publicly
held corporation; thereafter the business goals of the Association could be expected to reflect the interests of the holding
company rather than the aims of the Association's shareholders. The Court noted that the more familiar fundamental
corporate changes-merger, consolidation and dissolutionare accompanied by statutory and judicial safeguards for
minority shareholders.
Finding the exchange of stock an integral part of a scheme
that the defendants could reasonably have foreseen would
have, as an incidental effect, the destruction of a potential
public market for Association stock, the Court reasoned that
receipt of an appraised value reflecting only book value and
earnings would not compensate the minority shareholders
for loss of the opportunity to realize a profit from the intangible characteristics that attach to publicly traded stock
and enhance its value above book value. Therefore, held the
Court, if plaintiff, after trial, establishes facts in conformity
with the allegations of the complaint and the stipulated facts,
then, upon tender of the Association stock to defendants, plaintiff would be entitled to receive for each share tendered, at
her election, either (1) the appraised value of such shares
as of the date of the exchange, together with interest at 7%
per annum from the commencement of suit, or (2) a sum
equivalent to the fair market value, on the date of the commencement of suit, of the United securities received for each
share of Association stock, together with interest thereon
from the date of the commencement of suit, and the sum of
the course that they chose to follow.
At the trial of the cause defendants
can introduce evidence relevant to the
necessity for inclusion of other businesses." 1 Cal.3d 93, 114, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 592, 603-604, 460 P.2d 464, 475476 (1969).
CAL LAW 1970
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1. The defendants (in their Petition
for Rehearing or Modification of Opinion, pp. 3-8) urged that the discussion
of remedies be deleted from the opinion so as to allow the trial court in
the first instance to fashion an appropriate remedy based upon the evidence adduced at trial.
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$927.50 (the return of capital received by the original United
stockholders), with interest thereon from the date of such
return of capital. 2 This remedy, fashioned by the Court in
reviewing a judgment after demurrer, appears to be based
on the assumption that the marketing scheme could have been
carried out (either directly in the Association stock or through
the use of United) had all the minority shareholders been taken
along at the outset. In the typical case involving sale of the
controlling stock interest at a premium, the extent of the
premium would be established as of the time of sale. The
Court's second alternative, on the other hand, provides for
valuation at a substantially later date, the date plaintiff commences suit.s Presumably the controlling shareholder can
prevent market speculation by the minority by making or
procuring a reasonable (e.g., independent appraisal) offer for
the minority stock which would, in the event of subsequent
suit, put a ceiling on recovery.
Finally, the Court dealt also with the contention that a
cause of action had been stated as to restraint of trade in
violation of the Cartwright Act, 4 holding that, assuming arguendo that the Cartwright Act applies to transactions in corporate shares, the complaint was insufficient in that it did not
allege a purpose to restrain trade or an agreement among defendants not to purchase shares of Association stock from the
minority.
The language of Brown and Jones is far broader
than is necessitated by the facts,S and the practitioner faces

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/7

2. An example of the valuation
problems presented in the sale-at-apremium cases is found in the case of
Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173,
50 A.L.R.2d 1134 (2d Cir., 1955), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 952, 99 L.Ed. 1277,75
S.Ct. 880 (1955), and, particularly, the
opinion of the lower court on remand,
154 F.Supp. 436 (1957).
3. The appraisal remedy given to
dissenters in the event of a merger
provides for valuation, under Cal.
Corps. Code § 4300, as of the "day
178

before the vote of the shareholders
approving the agreement of merger or
consolidation, excluding any appreciation or depreciation in consequence of
the proposed action."
4. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 1672016758.
5. For example, although the Brown
opinion speaks of a "fiduciary relationship" between Halbert and the minority, the lones opinion characterizes
Brown as a "sale of only controlling
shareholder's shares to purchaser offerCAL LAW 1970
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substantial problems in dealing with potential applications
of these cases. Not the least of these difficulties is the potential conflict-of-Iaws problem lurking in fact situations where
the seller, purchaser or minority stockholders are domiciled
outside of California, or the corporate domicile or principal
place of business is located elsewhere. Because Brown and
Jones involved California contacts6 almost exclusively, there
was no need to consider this matter. With these cases the last
appellate word on the subject, cautious counsel will probably
have to advise prospective sellers (at least those who are
actually exercising control or holding corporate office and are
not merely passive investors) against accepting an offer for
a 51 % or greater stock interest (and perhaps even an offer
for a smaller stock interest if it represents, by itself or together
with stock known to the seller to be then owned by the buyer,
"working control"), where the offer is arguably at a premium
price (bearing in mind that this will be determined with the
benefit of hindsight), unless the offer is accompanied by a
like offer (or perhaps a commitment to make such an offer
promptly) to the minority stockholders. Like offer meaning
the same per share price for all or a similar proportion of their
ing to buy assets of corporation or all
shares." 1 Ca1.3d 93, 111, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 592, 601, 460 P.2d 464, 473
(1969).
6. United was incorporated under
Delaware law. The case law on this
subject in other jurisdictions is far
from clear. Perlman v. Feldmann,
219 F.2d 173,50 A.L.R. 1134 (2d Cir.,
1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952, 99
L.Ed. 1277, 75 S.Ct. 880 (1955), supra,
decided by the Second Circuit, purportedly applying Indiana law, has generally
been considered the leading case imposing liability on majority stockholders for
dealing in controlling stock interests.
In Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305
F.2d 572, 13 A.L.R.3d 346 (2d Cir.,
1962), the court said of Perlman:
[The] theory was basically
that the controlling shareholders in
CAL LAW 1970

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970

selling control to a potential customer
had appropriated to their personal
benefit a corporate asset: the premium
which the company's product could
command in a time of market shortage. (305 F2d 572, 576.)
Furthermore, a Delaware Chancellor
said the following about Perlmall
in Manacher v. Reynolds, 39 Del. Ch.
401, 165 A.2d 741, 751 (1960):
As to the Perlman case, which made
such an impact on the legal fraternity,
I think it may be distinguished on the
ground that its shares were sold to a
buyer with predictable resultant sacrifice in the corporation's good will. If
this distinction lacks substance, I can
only express a preference for the dissent's view that the increment in stock
value arising from control belongs to
the sellers, absent some breach of duty.
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holdings. 7 At the very least, the seller may have an obligation
to notify the minority of the existence of the offer. 8 The scope
of the seller's "fiduciary" obligation remains to be determined.
While the foregoing advice to the seller may protect him from
a lawsuit, it certainly casts on the buyer burdens not previously
thought to exist. 9 Whether it is now (or ever was) true that
the buyer has an absolute right to buy as cheaply as possible,
it should be borne in mind that the buyer becomes the dominant shareholder, subject to the "duty of fairness," as soon as
his purchase is consummated. It is arguable that this duty
devolves upon him even before the transaction is completed.
In summary, while the results of the Jones and Brown cases
were predictable, many unanswered questions remain.
\....

I say this because I am satisfied that
a practical decision of this issue has
been in existence in the business community for too many years for a court
to upset it.
7. According to Professor Andrew~:
[W]henever a controlling stockholder sells his shares, every other
holder of shares (of the same class) is
entitled to have an equal opportunity
to sell his shares or a pro rata part
of them on substantially the same
terms. Or in terms of the correlative
duty: before a controlling stockholder
may sell his shares to an outsider he
must assure his fellow stockholders an
equal opportunity to sell their shares,
or as high a proportion of theirs as
he ultimately sells of his own.
. . . First, it neither compels nor
prohibits a sale of stock at any particular price; it leaves a controlling
stockholder wholly free to decide for
himself the price above which he will
sell and below which he will hold his
shares. The rule only says that in
executing his decision to sell, a con-
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trolling stockholder cannot sell pursuant to a purchase offer more favorable than any available to other stockholders. Second, the rule does not
compel a prospective purchaser to
make an open offer for all shares on
the same terms. He can offer to purchase shares on the condition that he
gets a certain proportion of the total.
Or he can even make an offer to purchase 51 per cent of the shares, no
more and no less. The only requirement is that his offer, whatever it may
be, be made equally or proportionately
available to all stockholders.
Andrews, supra, at 515-516.
8. In the Jones case, the defendants
asserted that they had made full disclosure of all of the circumstances surrounding the formation of United.
9. For example, buyers attempting
to reach all of the minority shareholders may have to comply with the
Williams Bill. (Pub. Law No. 90-439,
adding sections 13(d) and (e) and 14
(d), (e) and (f) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.)
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III. 1969 Amendments to the California Corporations Code

A. Corporate Information Filings
The most notable of the 1969 legislative changes in the
California Corporations Code was the amendment of section
3301,1° and the addition of sections 3301.1-3, effective January 1, 1971. 11 The new provisions require more frequent and
expanded corporate information filings with the Secretary of
State, and impose the drastic sanction of suspension for failure
to comply. Section 3301 requires that every domestic corporation organized after January 1, 1971, file with the Secretary
of State, within 90 days after the filing of its articles, a statement of the names and complete business or residence addresses of its president, vice president, secretary and treasurer.
Furthermore, beginning in 1971, every domestic corporation
(except new corporations which file within 90 days after
formation) must file such a statement annually during the
period between April 1 and June 30. 12 Such filings are to
be made on a form to be prescribed by the Secretary of State,
together with a filing fee of not more than three dollars.ls
A copy of any filed statement can be obtained for a one-dollar
fee. A corporation is also required to attach a statement of
the names and addresses of its current officers when notifying
the Secretary of State of a change in the location or address
of the corporation's principal office, or in the stated address
of its designated agent. Section 3301 was also amended to
permit the revocation of a designation of an agent for service
of process without a simultaneous designation of a new agent.
Finally, new section 3301.3 authorizes the destruction by
the Secretary of State of any statement filed under section
3301, when it has been superseded by the filing of a new
statement.
10. Unless otherwise indicated, all
references in this segment of the
article to code sections refer to sections of the California Corporations
Code.
11. Stats. 1969, Ch. 1159.
12. The existing requirement for
CAL LAW 1970
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filing a statement of the location and
address of the corporation's principal
office was retained.
13. A $5 filing fee is set for a combined officer's statement, principal office
statement, and designation of agent for
service.
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It is the sanction attached to the failure to comply with
the filing requirements that makes these amendments so important. Formerly, the statute prescribed no penalty for
failure to file. New section 3301.1 requires that the Secretary of State shall, "as soon as practicable," suspend an offending corporation's powers, rights and privileges and notify the
corporation (at the last address disclosed in the records of
the Secretary of State) and the Franchise Tax Board thereof.14
One consequence of such suspension would be the risk that
the corporate name might be appropriated by another person
during the suspension. Section 3301.2 provides a procedure
for obtaining relief from suspension by applying to the Secretary of State on a prescribed form, filing the required information and paying the filing fee. 15

B. Reservation of Corporate Names
Another important change amends section 310 to extend
the effective period of certificates of reservation of a corporate
name from 30 to 60 days; concurrently, Government Code
section 12199 was amended to increase the fee for issuing
such certificates to $4.00.
C. Accounting Treatment of· Certain Transactions
Several changes were made 16 with regard to methods of
accounting for capital items. These changes vest the board
of directors with greater discretion in determining the accounting treatment of various transactions. The board may now
allocate to paid-in surplus a portion of the consideration re-
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14. The Secertary of State's office
has announced it will give advance
notice of the filing requirements to
the domestic corporations for which it
has addresses. Commencing in 1971,
each person submitting articles for
filing will receive a copy of the statement form. As to the annual filing
requirement, the Secretary of State's
office plans to mail a copy of the
required form to each corporation
early in March of each year. This
182

'should help to prevent suspensions
arising out of inadvertent failures to
comply with the new requirements.
Reports, State Bar of California, vol.
10, no. 1, p. 2 (Jan., 1970).
15. Such application may be made
by any shareholder or creditor or by
a majority of the surviving directors
or trustees of the corporation.
§§

16. Stats. 1969, Ch. 481, amending
1900, 1901, 3905 and 4117.
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ceived for no-par stock (without regard to liquidation preference); heretofore all such consideration was required to be
credited to stated capital. 17 Surplus on the books of a corporation acquired by purchase (section 3905) or by merger or
consolidation (section 4117) may now, to the extent not
capitalized by the issue of shares or otherwise, be entered
as earned or paid-in surplus, if to do so would be "in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles."18 Finally, excess consideration received from the issuance of par
value shares may now, upon a sale of the corporation's assets,
or upon a merger or a consolidation, be entered as either
earned or paid-in surplus, in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
D. Treasury Shares
When a corporation acquires its own shares in connection
with a merger or consolidation or a distribution of another
corporation's assets, section 1709 requires that those shares
either be carried as treasury shares or retired. This section
was amended to specify that this rule applies whether the
other corporation involved is domestic or foreign.

E. Plan of Arrangement
Section 4400 authorizes various fundamental changes in
the operation or structure of a corporation without director
or shareholder approval, if the changes are carried out pursuant to a reorganization under federal law confirmed by an
order of a federal court. The scope of sections 310, 4400,
4403 and 4404, was expanded19 to include actions carried
out pursuant to a plan of arrangement authorized under federal law, under the same conditions as those specified for
reorganizations. 20 Authority so granted may be exercised by
17. This could be of consequence
since dividends may be paid and stock
may be redeemed out of paid-in surplus. (See §§ 1500, 1706.)
18. This standard is in contrast to
the previous standard of "sound accounting practice."
CAL LAW 1970
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19. Stats. 1969, Ch. 322.
20. Section 4401 enumerates the
types of reorgal1izations for which
§ 4400 authority is available; there is
no similar provision limiting the
eligible types of arrangements, and
presumably any plan of arrangement
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or under the supervision of a trustee, receiver, or committee
of creditors.
F. Miscellaneous
Finally, several minor changes were adopted, including the
following: New section 3632.5 1 provides an additional method for amending the articles of incorporation of a nonstock
corporation. 2 If the bylaws so provide, the articles may now
be amended by the vote or written consent of two-thirds of a
policy-making committee created by and composed solely of
members of the corporation. 3 A.B. 1096 codified various
provisions presently found in the state Constitution, which
are omitted from the proposed revised Constitution. New
section 129 states: "No corporation, association or individual
shall issue or put in circulation, as money, anything but the
lawful money of the United States."
IV. 1969 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation
Law

The 1969 amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law affected some thirty sections.4 Since that statute
had undergone extensive revision in 1967, many of the 1969
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approved by a federal court under a
federal statute will qualify.
1. Stats. 1969, Ch. 396.
2. Other methods are set forth in
§ 3632.
3. Section 3672, dealing with the certificate of amendment to be filed with
the Secretary of State, was amended to
conform with this new provision.
4. House Bill No. 270, Laws of
1969, approved June 23, 1969, and
effective July 15, 1969, amended sections 102, 103, 122, 126, 141, 144, 151,
153, 155, 212, 213, 214, 218, 224, 228,
229, 242, 251, 252, 253, 256, 258, 262,
271, 275, 311, 344, 371 and 379 of the
General Corporation Law. House Bill
No. 290, Laws of 1969, approved and
184

effective June 23, 1969, amended section 243. House Bill No. 252, Laws of
1969, approved June 23, 1969, and effective July 15, 1969, amended sections
371 and 391 to increase certain filing
fees. The same bill also increased, by
10%, the Delaware annual franchise
tax and raised the minimum tax from
$10 to $20 and the maximum from
$100,000 to $110,000. Also, the annual report filing fee was increased to
$10 for domestic corporations and to
$30 for foreign corporations.
Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this segment of the article
to code sections refer to sections of
the Delaware General Corporation
Law.
CAL LAW 1970
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changes were of a housekeeping nature. It is the purpose of
this segment of the article to call attention to the more important changes, particularly those of a substantive nature, keying (by footnote citation) the amendments discussed to the
parallel California statutory provisions. The amendments
are discussed under four headings: "Corporate Finance Matters;" "Corporate Management Matters"; "Stockholders Matters"; and "Miscellaneous". The general thrust of the amendments is to enhance the attractiveness of the Delaware
corporation as an intrepreneurial tool by facilitating corporate activity and increasing the power and flexibility of corporate management. 5
A. Corporate Finance Matters
1. Merger, Consolidation and Sale of Assets
Two of the most important changes made in 1969 were
in the area of merger, consolidation and sale of assets. First,
the requirement for stockholder approval of a merger or consolidation was reduced from two-thirds of the total number
of the outstanding shares of capital stock to "a majority of
the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote
thereon."6 This is not merely a reduction from two-thirds
to a majority; the amendment also makes it possible to deprive a stockholder of the right to vote on this issue. Whether
stock is entitled to vote on a merger is determined by the
certificate of incorporation. 7 The provision for stockholder
5. For other discussions of the subject matter of this segment of the
article see Folk, Amendments to the
Delaware General Corporation Law
and Technical Amendments Act (Corporation Service Company, 1969), and
Arsht and Stapleton, A nalysis of the
1969 Amendments to the Delaware
Corporation Law (Prentice-Hall Corporation Law Service 347).
6. Del. Corp. Law § 251. Unless
the articles require a greater percentage, Cal. Corps. Code § 4) 07 requires
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approval of "not less than two-thirds
of the issued and outstanding shares
of each class, regardless of limitations
or restrictions on the voting power
thereof, entitled to vote at a meeting. . . ."
7. This amendment, when read in
conjunction with Del. Corp. Law § 212,
as amended, authorizes the granting to
a particular class or series of stock of
a weighted vote in connection with a
merger or consolidation.
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approval of a sale of all or substantially all of the corporation's
assets was amended to make its language identical to that of
the amended merger provisions. 8
SecoI).d, the permissible forms of consideration which may
be given to effect a merger have been enlarged; now "property" and "rights" may be utilized, as well as cash and securities. The statute expressly authorizes the conversion or
exchange of shares of a constituent corporation into or for
"cash, property, rights or securities of any other corporation,"
as well as shares of the surviving or resulting corporation. 9
Thus, the merger agreement may now provide for the conversion of shares into a right to receive shares of the resulting or surviving corporation, or a parent thereof (the socalled triangular merger), in the future upon the happening
of specified events, even if that right is not evidenced by a
"security." Parallel changes have been made in the provisions
permitting the merger of Delaware and non-Delaware corporations and the provisions concerning short-form mergers between parent and subsidiary.lO
By virtue of the 1967 general revision, a merger could
be consummated without stockholder approval where the
surviving corporation did not amend its charter or issue or
deliver shares (authorized and unissued or treasury shares)
of any class of its stock in excess of 15 percent of the number
of shares of that class outstanding immediately prior to the
merger. The 1969 amendment continues this exemption
from stockholder approval, but requires that there be executed
and filed a certificate reciting the facts which excuse stock8. Del. Corp. Law § 271 (a); the
former language called for "the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the stock issued and outstanding
having voting power at a stockholders'
meeting." Cal. Corps. Code § 3901
requires approval of "a majority of
the voting power of the corporation,"
unless the articles impose a more
stringent approval requirement.
9. Del. Corp. Law §§ 251, 252:
compare Cal. Corps. Code § 4103
186
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("cash, property, or securities, in whole
or in part, in lieu of shares [of the
consolidated or surviving corporation].

. .

.")

10. Del. Corp. Law §§ 252, 253;
compare Cal. Corps. Code §§ 4118
(merger or consolidation of California
and foreign corporation), 4124 (shortform merger of California corporation
and California or foreign whollyowned subsidiary).
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holder approval. The amendment further provides that such
filing constitutes a representation that the facts remain true
immediately prior to the filing.l1
A requirement that an agreement governing the merger of
Delaware corporations set forth the provisions or facts required or permitted under Delaware law to be stated in the
charter was deleted. The substitute provision requires that the
merger agreement state such amendments in the charter of
the surviving corporation as are desired to be effected by the
merger or consolidation, or if no such amendments are desired,
a statement that the charter of one of the constituents shall
be the charter of the surviving or resulting corporation. 12
Finally, several language changes were made in the provisions governing the merger or consolidation of foreign and
Delaware corporations. 13 Previously, the statute authorized
such a merger if the foreign jurisdiction was one "which permit (s) such merger or consolidation." It was unclear whether this clause required that the foreign law authorize the
particular form of merger authorized in Delaware, or merely
that the foreign law authorize generally a merger between
domestic and foreign corporations. 14 The statutory language was amended to make clear that the latter interpretation was correct. Therefore, a Delaware corporation may
utilize the short-form procedure even though the domicile
of the foreign corporation with which it is merging does not
authorize such short-form mergers. Of course, the foreign
corporation must still comply with the requirements of the
law of its domicile. 15
2. Appraisal Rights
In Delaware, appraisal rights are given only to dissenters
from proposed mergers and consolidations. 16 Even as to
11. Del. Corp. Law § 251(f).
12. Del. Corp. Law § 251(b).
13. Del. Corp. Law §§ 252, 253,
256 and 258.
14. This question arose particularly
in the context of short-form mergers
pursuant to Del. Corp. Law § 253.
CAL LAW 1970
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15. Compare Cal. Corps. Code
4118, dealing with mergers and consolidations of California and foreign
corporations.
§

16. This is true in California as
well. See Cal. Corps. Code §§ 4300 et
seq.
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these, Section 262 (k) heretofore denied (in the absence
of a contrary charter provision) appraisal rights with respect
to any class or series of shares registered on a national securities exchange or held of record by not less than 2,000 stockholders. Appraisal rights were also denied to stockholders
of a surviving corporation if, by virtue of section 251 (f),
a vote of the stockholders of the surviving corporation was
not required. Appraisal rights were withheld from these two
categories, however, only if the plan provided for the stockholders to receive only stock of the resulting or surviving
corporation or stock and cash in lieu of fractional shares.
So-called triangular mergers have become quite common,
and the effect of this provision was to deny appraisal rights
to the stockholders of a publicly held company who received
stock of the resulting or surviving corporation, but to confer
such rights upon stockholders of such a corporation who received shares of a parent of the resulting or surviving corporation. Section 262 (k) now denies the appraisal remedy
if the stockholders receive stock of "any other corporation"
so long as the stock they are to receive is either registered
on a national securities exchange or is held of record by not
less thn 2,000 stockholders. Thus, the appraisal right is now
avoidable in the common situation where the stockholders of
a constituent corporation receive the stock of the parent of
the resulting or surviving corporation. 17
On the other hand, section 262 (b) was amended 18 to provide the appraisal remedy to stockholders who "were not
entitled to vote" on the merger or consolidation and who filed
written objection thereto before the taking of the vote. 19 Also,
section 262 was further amended to preserve the appraisal
right, where the merger or consolidation is approved by
17. Provided that the stock received
is either registered on a national securities exchange or is held of record by
not less than 2,000 shareholders.
18. This change was necessitated by
the amendment to Del. Corp. Law
§ 251 (c), di5cussed above in connection
with mergers and consolidations.
188
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19. Under the amended merger
provisions, notice of the stockholders'
meeting called to vote upon a merger
must be sent to all stockholders
whether or not they are entitled to
vote on the merger. Del. Corp. Law
§ 251(c).
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written consent rather than at a stockholders' meeting, for
those stockholders who either did not, or had no right to,
consent thereto.
3. Consideration for Shares
Section 153 was amended to delete the requirement that
consideration for shares be expressed in dollars.20
4. Convertible Securities
By greatly expanding the types of permissible convertible
securities, the amendment to section 151 (e) increased flexibility in corporate finance matters. Stock of any class or
series may now be made convertible into or exchangeable for
stock of any other class or series; convertibility had previously
been limited to "preferred or special stock." Thus, there is
now explicit authorization for convertible common stock and
for the convertibility of shares of any series into another series
of the same class. Furthermore, the statute now explicitly
states that such conversion or exchange may be (1) at the
option of the corporation, or (2) at the option of the holder of
the security, or (3) upon the happening of a specified event. 1
5. Fractional Shares
The 1969 amendments also increased flexibility in instances when a corporation elects not to issue fractional shares.
Previously, the corporation had either (1) to pay in cash the
fair value of fractional shares as of the time of the determination of persons entitled to receive them, or (2) to issue scrip
or warrants entitling the holder to receive a certificate for
a full share upon surrender of scrip or warrants aggregating
a full share. Section 155 now permits the corporation, as a
third alternative, to "arrange for the disposition of fractional
interests by those entitled thereto." Further, the amendments
20. Compare Cal. Corps. Code
1112, requiring the board to "state
by resolution its determination of the
fair value to the corporation in mone§
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tary terms" of the non-money consideration for shares.
1. Compare Cal. Corps. Code §§
1100, 1103 and 1104.
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specified the rights (voting, receipt of dividends, and participation in liquidation distributions) which are enjoyed by
holders of fractional shares, but not by scrip or warrant
holders absent specific provision therefor. 2
B. Corporate Management Matters

Delaware law has long provided that a corporation may,
by charter provision, deviate from the norm of management
of its business by the board of directors. s It was thereby intended to permit owners to establish whatever managerial
structure best suited a particular enterprise. Nevertheless,
questions persisted as to the scope of the authorization to
situate ultimate managerial power elsewhere than in the
board, and as to the relationship between section 141 (a), and
statutory provisions expressly calling for action by directors.
Section 141 (a) now provides that where in allocation of
such powers diverges from the norm, all powers and duties
usually conferred or imposed upon the board "shall be exercised or performed to such extent and by such person or persons" as the charter provides.
In addition to the powers granted in the charter and elsewhere in the statute, Delaware corporations have the powers
specified in section 122. Prior to the 1969 amendments,
Delaware corporations were empowered, in time of war or
other national emergency, notwithstanding charter restrictions, to do any lawful business in aid thereof at the request
or direction of any apparently authorized governmental authority. Section 122(12) was amended to empower the
corporation to "transact any lawful business which the corporation's board of directors shall find to be in aid of governmental authority." This removes the limitation to emer2. Compare Cal. Corps. Code § 2215
(articles or by-laws may deprive fractional shares of voting rights).
3. Del. Corp. Law § 141(a); compare Cal. Corps. Code § 800, which
provides: "Subject to limitations of
the articles and of this division as to
190
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action which shall be authorized or
approved by the shareholders, all cor·
porate powers shall be exercised by or
under authority of, and the business
and affairs of every corporation shall
be controlled by [the board of directors]."
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gency conditions and shifts the focus to the board's finding
of facts and exercise of business judgment.
The board may now consist of a single member. 4 The statute previously had set a minimum of three, unless all shares
were owned beneficially and of record by fewer than three
persons, in which event the number of directors could be
equal to or greater than the number of stockholders. Another amendment to section 141 (b) clarified existing law
by explicitly stating that the number of directors may be fixed
by either the charter or the by-Iaws. s Section 141 (b) was
also amended to delete the numerical minimum with regard
to a quorum of directors (formerly two directors, except in
the case of a one-man board); the fractional minimum of 1/3,
however, has been retained. Thus, the statute now provides
that a majority of the board constitutes a quorum unless a
greater number is required by the charter or by-laws and,
unless the charter otherwise provides, the by-laws may provide for a smaller quorum so long as it is not less than 1/3
of the entire board, e.g., one director when the board consists
of three or fewer directors. 6
Amendments to section 229 and the addition of section
141 (i) have facilitated the conduct of board meetings and
dispensed with unnecessary formalities. Attendance at a
meeting of the board or any committee now operates as a
waiver of notice of that meeting, and where a written waiver
of notice is utilized the waiver need not recite the purpose
of the meeting. 7 These provisions previously applied only
4. Del. Corp. Law § 141(b); Cal.
Corps. Code § 800 requires a board of
not less than three directors.
5. Compare Cal. Corps. Code §§ 301
(d) and 501(d), permitting the articles or
by-laws to provide for an indefinite
number of directors (not less than a
stated minimum of five or more), and
permitting the number of directors to
be changed by amendment of the
articles or, unless the articles provide
otherwise, amendment of the by-laws.
6. Compare Cal. Corps. Code § 816,
CAL LAW 1970
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which provides as follows: "A majority of the authorized number of directors constitutes a quorum of the board
for the transaction of business unless
the articles or by-laws provide that a
different number, which in no case
shall be less than one-third the
authorized number of directors, nor
less than two, constitutes a quorum."
7. Compare Cal. Corps. Code § 814,
which provides in part as follows:
"The transactions of any meeting of
the board of directors, however called
1·91
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to stockholder meetings. Furthermore, a member of the
board or of a committee is deemed present in person at a
meeting if, by virtue of a conference telephone call or similar
communications arrangement, all persons participating in the
meeting can hear each other. The applicability of this provision can be negated by a provision in the charter or by-laws.
Section 141 (c) previously contained a sweeping authorization which, read literally, empowered committees of the
board of directors to exercise all powers of the board to the
extent that they were delegated in the by-laws or in the resolution creating the committee. The 1969 amendments more
specifically defined the scope of the power that may be delegated. This eliminated the possibility that there might be
certain "fundamental" or "extraordinary" powers which are
nondelegable. The statute now authorizes any committee, to
the extent provided in the by-laws or in the board resolution
creating the committee, to exercise all of the power and authority of the board, subject to two classes of exceptions.
First, no committee may exercise the board's power with
respect to amending the charter, adopting an agreement of
merger or consolidation, recommending to stockholders the
transfer of all or substantially all of the corporation's property, recommending to stockholders a dissolution or the revocation of a dissolution, or amending the by-laws. Second, a
committee may declare dividends or authorize the issuance of
stock only pursuant to an express delegation of these powers in
the charter, by-laws or resolution creating the committee. s
Another amendment to section 141 (c) reduced the minimum
and noticed or wherever held, are as
valid as though had at a meeting duly
held after regular call and notice, if
a quorum is present and if, either
before or after the meeting, each of
the directors not present signs a written waiver of notice, a consent to
holding the meeting, or an approval
of the minutes thereof."
8. Compare Cal. Corps. Code § 822,
which provides in part as follows:
192

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/7

"The by-laws may provide for the appointment by the board of directors
of an executive committee and other
committees and may authorize the
board to delegate to the executive
committee any of the powers and
authority of the board in the management of the business and affairs of the
corporation, except the power to declare dividends and to adopt, amend
or repeal by-laws."
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size of a committee of the board from two directors to
one. 9
The board is now expressly authorized to fix the compensation of directors, absent a restriction in the charter or by-Iaws. 10
In the area of transactions involving common or interested
directors or officers, the validation provisions were expanded
so that a transaction which would otherwise be tainted is
now validated if approved by the affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors, even though the disinterested
directors comprise less than a quorum. ll Previously, approval
was required by a vote sufficient for such purpose without
counting the vote of interested directors. Furthermore, other
amendments to section 144 make it clear that the entire section is applicable to both the common and the interested
director situation.
The statute broadly authorizes corporations to keep their
records (including stock ledgers, books of account, and minute books) 12 on any convenient information storage device, including devices utilized with computers, Section 224 was
amended to provide that a "clearly legible written form produced" from the original record-keeping mechanism is admissible in evidence and shall be accepted for all other purposes
to the same extent an original written record would have been,
"when said written form accurately portrays the record." The
statute had previously specified that the original form (e.g.,
cards, tapes, microphotographs, etc.) would be admissible.
9. The executive committee of a
California corporation must be com·
posed of two or more directors. Cal.
Corps. Code § 822.
10. Compare Cal. Corps. Code § 501
(d), providing that the by·laws may
make provision, not in conflict with
law or the articles, for the compensation of directors.
11. Del. Corp. Law § 144; compare
Cal. Corps. Code § 820, permitting
common or interested directors to be
counted in determining the presence
of a quorum, but requiring action by
a vote sufficient for the purpose with·
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out counting the votes of such direc·
tors.
12. Compare Cal. Corps. Code §§
3000-3004; in 1963, Cal. Corps. Code
§ 3002 was amended to permit the
keeping of information required in the
share register on "punchcards, magnet·
ic tape, or other information storage
device related to electronic data proc·
essing equipment provided that such
card, tape, or other equipment is ca·
pable of reproducing the information
in clearly legible form for the purposes
of inspection as provided in Section
3003."
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C. Stockholder Matters
Stockholder action by non unanimous written consent was
originally validated in the 1967 Delaware Code revision. This
is in sharp contrast with the majority of other jurisdictions
where stockholder action by written consent is permitted only
if unanimous. 13 Now, Delaware has gone even further to
facilitate stockholder action by written consent. An amendment to section 228 authorizes such nonunanimous written
consent (i.e., consent by the holders of stock having not less
than the minimum number of votes that would be necessary
to take such action at a meeting at which all shares entitled
to vote thereon were present and voted) unless the charter provides otherwise. Previously, such action was permitted only
if the charter affirmatively authorized it. Furthermore, notice
of action by nonunanimous written consent need be given
only to the nonconsenting stockholders. If action so taken
results in a document required to be filed with the Secretary
of State, such filing must contain appropriate recitals that
the action was taken in conformity with the statute, and that
written notice has been given to nonconsenting stockholders.
A related provision14 specifies that the record date for expressing stockholder action by written consent is the day when
the first consent is given, unless a record date is formally set
under the statutory procedure therefor.
Several of the 1969 amendments directly concerned voting
rights. With regard to cumulative voting, Delaware,15 unlike
California/ 6 continues to make cumulative voting permissive
rather than mandatory. Section 214 has been amended to
make it clear that a charter provision conferring cumulative
voting rights may specify that such privilege will be enjoyed
by one or more classes or series within classes. Previously,
the statute spoke only of "each holder of stock." This section
was also amended to make clear that a stockholder having
13. Compare, e.g., Cal. Corps. Code
§ 2239.

15. Del. Corp. Law § 214.
16. Cal. Corps. Code § 2235.

14. Del. Corp. Law § 213; compare
Cal. Corps. Code §§ 2214, 2215.
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cumulative voting rights is entitled to the number of votes
he would otherwise have, multiplied by the number of directors to be elected by him. The prior language, when read
literally, did not fit the situation where a class that enjoyed
cumulative voting rights was entitled to elect only part of
the board.
Another amendment in this area concerned fractional and
multiple voting. Before the 1969 amendments, a charter
provision prescribing a deviation from the one-share-one-vote
norm, at least as to election of directors, was permitted. l7
It was not clear whether fractional or multiple voting was
permissible as to other matters. Section 212(a) has been
amended to provide that where the charter prescribes more
or less than one vote for any share on any matter, all statutory
references to "a majority or other proportion of stock shall
refer to such majority or other proportion of the votes of
such stock."
Section 275, which sets forth the procedure for dissolution,
now provides that a proposed dissolution requires the approval
of a majority of the outstanding stock entitled to vote thereon;
heretofore, the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the voting
stock was required. ls Section 311, pertaining to the revocation of a voluntary dissolution, was amended to conform by
permitting such revocation by the vote of a majority of the
stock which was outstanding and entitled to vote on a dissolution at the time of dissolution. l9 Furthermore, a new provision20 authorizes dissolution, without meetings of directors
or stockholders, upon the written consent of all stockholders
entitled to vote on a dissolution.
Section 242 was amended to provide that if a proposed
charter amendment would adversely affect less than all of the
17. Del. Corp. Law § 212; compare
Cal. Corps. Code § 2215, which provides in part: "In the absence of any
contrary provision in the articles or
in any statute relating to the election
of directors or to other particular matters, each [ record shareholder] is entitled to one vote for each share."
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18. Compare Cal. Corps. Code
4600 (vote or written consent of "50
percent or more" of the voting power).
19. Compare Cal. Corps. Code
§ 4606 (vote or written consent of
"not less than a majority" of the
voting power).
20. Del. Corp. Law § 275(c).
§
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series within a class of stock, then the class vote required
to approve such action applies only to the series affected,
rather than to the class as a whole. 1 Thus, affected stockholders are no longer lumped together with others who have
no interest in the action proposed.
The Delaware statute, as revised in 1967, provided that
unless extended in the prescribed manner, a voting trust or
other stockholder voting agreement would be effective for
a maximum period of 10 years. Section 218 was amended
in 1969 to specify that the validity of a voting trust is not
adversely affected during the 10-year period of validity, even
though by its terms it purports to run beyond 10 years; the
savings clause previously referred only to voting agreements. 2
The 1967 revision reversed the pre-existing common law
preemptive right by providing that in the absence of an
express charter provision granting preemptive rights, no such
rights would exist. 3 It was intended that this change would
operate prospectively without destroying existing preemptive
rights. The 1969 amendments clarified this savings provision by expressly declaring that all preemptive rights in existence on July 3, 1967, the effective date of the 1967 revision,
remain unaffected by section 102 (b )( 3 ), unless altered by
appropriate action expressly making such alteration.
Section 102(b) (3) was also amended to provide that preemptive rights might be granted as to a particular class or series,
and to provide explicitly that preemptive rights to subscribe
to a security convertible into a designated class or series do
not exist unless the charter expressly grants such rights as to
the convertible security.
1. Compare Cal. Corps. Code §§
3632-3638.
2. Compare Cal. Corps. Code §§
2230 and 2231, validating voting trusts
for a period not greater than 21 years.
3. Compare Cal. Corps. Code § 305,
permitting inclusion in the articles of
provisions granting "preemptive rights
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to subscribe to any or all issues of
shares or securities," and Cal. Corps.
Code § 1106, which provides as follows:
"Unless the articles provide
otherwise, the board of directors may
issue shares, option rights, or securities having conversion or option rights,
without first offering them to shareholders of any class."
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D. Miscellaneous
New section 103(f) validates the eXIstmg administrative
practice in the office of the Delaware Secretary of State by
which a corporation may correct a previously filed inaccurate
or defective instrument. The statute now expressly authorizes
the filing of a certificate of correction which specifies the
inaccuracy or defect to be corrected and sets forth the portion
of the instrument in corrected form. The corrected instrument
is made retroactively effective as of the date of the filing of
the original instrument, except for preserving the interests of
those "substantially and adversely affected by the correction,"
as to whom it is effective as of the filing of the certificate of
correction.
The restrictions on name use which have heretofore been
applicable to businesses incorporated in Delaware have now
been made applicable to foreign corporations. Section 371
( c) was amended to prohibit the issuance to a foreign corporation of a certificate stating that it has filed its charter with
the Delaware Secretary of State, unless the foreign corporation's name is such as to distinguish it from the names of corporations organized in Delaware and the names of other
foreign corporations reserved or registered with the Secretary
of State (unless the other corporation consents).4
Not unexpectedly, Section 391 was amended to increase
various fees to be charged by the Secretary of State.
Finally, in 1969, the Delaware legislature enacted a Professional Service Corporation Act which, generally speaking, permits the incorporation of individuals or groups engaged in licensed professions. 5
The net effect of the 1969 amendments was to make Dela4. Compare Cal. Corps. Code § 6404.
5. Ch. 6, tit. 8, Del. Code, enacted
by House Bill No. 106, approved and
effective June 7, 1969. In California,
the Moscone-Knox Professional Corporation Act, Cal. Corps. Code § §
13400-13410, which became effective
November 13, 1968, authorized the
CAL LAW 1970
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formation of professional corporations
for the rendering of professional services by lawyers, doctors, osteopaths,
podiatrists and dentists. In 1969, this
privilege was extended to certified
psychologists under § 2995 of the
California Business and Professions
Code.
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ware corporation law an even better tool for corporate management, and to require even more care than before in the
drafting of charter and by-law provisions for Delaware corporations.
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